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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is brought before the Utah Court of Appeals as of 
right pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This appeal is taken from a final order dated March 31, 
1995 (R 286-287) in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Utah in a domestic matter. The Notice of Appeal was filed April 
28, 1995. (R 288) 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the facts support a finding that Plaintiff and Mr. 
Hunter were residing together within the meaning of 30-3-5(6) UCA 
and paragraph 13 of the Decree of Divorce? 
a) Standard of Review: The issue in this case is a mixed 
question of fact and law. Consequently, the appeals court is not 
bound by the conclusion of the trial court. Haddow vs. Haddow, 707 
P2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, the appeals courts in Utah 
are vested with broad equitable powers in divorce actions when 
reviewing a trial courts decision. Haddow, supra see also Read vs. 
Read, 594 P.2d 871,872-73 (Utah 1979). 
b) The issues raised in this appeal were raised in the trial 
court, being substantive rather than technical, and are thus 
preserved for appeal. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The provisions of § 30-3-5(6) UCA are determinative of this 
case. 
"(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing 
with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is 
further established by the person receiving alimony that 
that relationship or association is without any sexual 
contact payment of alimony shall resume." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case. 
This is a domestic action wherein Defendant (Robert Pendleton) 
seeks to be relieved from the obligation to pay alimony to 
Plaintiff (Joyce Pendleton) arising from a Decree of Divorce 
entered March 5, 1991 in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
presiding. (R 178) Robert Pendleton alleges that alimony should 
terminate by reason of Joyce Pendleton's cohabitation, as set forth 
in said Decree at paragraph 13: 
" 13. . . . The defendant is ordered to pay alimony 
until the death of the plaintiff, the remarriage of the 
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plaintiff, cohabitation of the Plaintiff, or further 
order of this Court." (R 176-177) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Robert Pendleton filed a Petition for Termination of Alimony 
on the 26th day of October, 1993. (R 233) Plaintiff was served 
with a Summons and the Petition for Termination of Alimony on 
December 12, 1993. (R 240) Plaintiff, by counsel, filed an Answer 
to Petition for Termination of Alimony on or about January 14, 
1994. (R 247) There were no motions for temporary relief. 
Defendant's Petition for Termination of Alimony was tried to the 
Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup on January 27, 1995 without a jury. 
The court made it's Findings of Fact from the bench. An order 
dismissing Defendant's Petition for Termination of Alimony without 
prejudice was entered on March 31, 1995. (R 286-287) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Joyce and Robert Pendleton were divorced March 5, 1991. Joyce 
was awarded various marital property and monthly alimony. "The 
Defendant is ordered to pay alimony until the death of the 
Plaintiff, the remarriage of the Plaintiff, cohabitation of the 
Plaintiff, or further order of this court," (paragraph 13 of the 
Decree of Divorce), emphasis added. (R 176-177) 
In August, 1993, Robert became aware that Joyce had entered 
into a relationship with Bill Hunter and it appeared by September, 
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1993 that Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter were cohabitating 
together at her residence. Robert Pendleton thereupon filed his 
Petition for Termination of Alimony and commenced payment of the 
alimony amounts into an escrow account pending the outcome of that 
petition. (R281-282) 
At trial, the Court found and Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter 
testified that they had commenced a sexual relationship in July of 
1993 which relationship continued to early February, 1994. (R 
282, Findings of Fact 3) It is noteworthy that the depositions of 
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter were taken by Robert Pendleton's 
attorney on January 26, 1994. (R 294,324) Joyce Pendleton and Bill 
Hunter testified that there was a hiatus in their relationship 
during the period February, 1994 through July, 1994 but that their 
relationship had resumed by August, 1994. (R 282, Findings of Fact 
3, 4) 
Joyce and Mr. Hunter testified, and the court found, that 
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter spent most of their free time 
together. (R 303 L3 - L5)(R 282, Findings of Fact 5) When Bill 
Hunter was in town, they spent the nights together at her home, or 
his apartment. (R 386 L25 - 387 L17) Joyce Pendleton is self 
employed as a beautician (R 332 L23 - 333 L3) and Bill Hunter is 
a sales agent for a Salt Lake real estate brokerage. (R 304 LI -
L2) 
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Bill Hunter was separated, but not divorced from, his wife, 
Janet Hunter. (R 283, Findings of Fact 14) He testified that 
during the hiatus period, approximately February through July, 
1994, he followed Janet Hunter and their minor children to Montana, 
but traveled to Salt Lake frequently. (R 400 L10 - L19) 
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter testified that they had plans 
to marry (R 403 LI - L4; R 370 LI - L4; R 339 L 23 - L25; R 311 L24 
- 312 L8) evidencing an intent to continue the relationship. They 
ate meals together (R 282, Findings of Fact 6) and shared some 
expenses, particularly when they traveled out of town together. (R 
340 L25 - R343 L5) (R 283, Findings of Fact 12) The court found 
that Bill Hunter frequently purchased their meals when they ate out 
but that Ms. Pendleton provided the groceries when they ate at her 
residence. (R 282, Findings of Fact 6) (R338 L21 - L23, R 343 L6 -
R 344 L15, R 3070 L7 - L20) 
It was undisputed that Bill Hunter kept some clothing and his 
briefcase at Ms. Pendleton7s home. (R 366 L3 - 367 L22; R 282, 
Findings of Fact 7; R 337 L9 - L21) It is further established that 
Joyce Pendleton did some laundry for Bill Hunter and took some of 
his clothes to the dry cleaners, for which she paid but was 
reimbursed. (R 282, Findings of Fact 8) Bill Hunter had his own 
key to Joyce Pendleton's residence. (R 301 L 17 - L23) He came and 
went whether or not Joyce was there, and frequently left for work 
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directly from her residence after spending the night there. (R 447 
L6 - L14; R 283, Findings of Fact 9) Joyce Pendleton had a key to 
Bill Hunter's apartment (R 301 L22 - L23) as well as keys to Bill 
Hunter's cars, and the use of his car for a period of time. (R 376 
L6 - L23) 
Bill Hunter provided evidence that he rented an apartment by 
a lease dated one day prior to the filing of Robert Pendleton's 
Petition. (R 283, Findings of Fact 10, transcript P17 L15-20) 
During the course of these proceedings, he kept some of his 
personal belongings at the apartment, some at the home of his 
estranged wife, some in his car and some at the home of Joyce 
Pendleton. (R 447, L20-24) Mr. Hunter testified that he spent 
only one or two hours per day at the apartment. (R 312 LI3 - L21, 
395 L15 - 396 Lll) He spent four to five days per week at Joyce 
Pendleton's (R 344 L13 - LI4; R 300 L23 - R301 L4) 
Mr. Hunter used his apartment, rather than Joyce's home, as 
a mailing address. (R 283, Findings of Fact 11) 
Neither Joyce Pendleton nor Bill Hunter was financially 
dependent on the other. Both were self supporting adults at the 
commencement of their relationship. They did not open any joint 
bank accounts or incur any joint obligations. 
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter attended gatherings of her 
family as a couple. (R 340 L3 - L12; R 314 L20 - R 315 L2) 
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During the pendency of these proceedings, no alimony payments 
were made to Joyce Pendleton nor did she make any demand for 
payment or initiate any action for the enforcement of that 
obligation. (R 432 L25 - 433 L9) 
The trial court found that the case turned on the issue of 
"residence" as opposed to "cohabitation". (R P445 L25 - P446 L4) 
Particularly, the court found that the term "residence" connotes 
"some sort of duration". (R P446 L6 - 10) The trial court also 
noted that there was minimal financial contribution from Bill 
Hunter to Joyce Pendleton. (R 449 LI7 - 21) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter resided together within the 
meaning of § 30-3-5(6) U.C.A. In this fact sensitive case, the 
details of the relationship between Joyce Pendleton and bill Hunter 
clearly support a finding that they had established a joint 
residence, which continued for 8 months, was interrupted by Robert 
Pendleton's efforts to terminate alimony, but had resumed on a more 
circumspect basis several months before trial. 
The relationship was open and notorious; there was sharing of 
finances and household duties, of bed and board, free access to the 
shared residence and an avowed intention to continue the 
relationship, and to someday marry. 
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Joyce Pendleton made no attempt to defend on the basis of lack 
of sexual contact; this element of cohabitation was never 
contested. Nor did Joyce Pendleton excuse the relationship by 
raising a Knuteson defense. Joyce Pendleton characterizes her 
relationship with Bill Hunter as "dating". 
II 
Plaintiff' cohabitation was the type of abuse of alimony that 
the legislature sought to address. 
Utah's statute, unique in the country, terminates alimony for 
residing with a member of the opposite sex, if sexual contact is 
a part of that relationship, regardless of the financial 
consequences of the relationship. The continuing sexual aspect o 
this relationship satisfies the requirement of "cohabitation" as 
set forth in the Decree of Divorce. Proof of "residence", to 
satisfy the statute is less precise. 
Utah#s lawmakers were concerned that divorced spouses, whose 
right to receive alimony would end on remarriage, were 
circumventing the statute by entering into de facto marriages, i.e. 
residing together. The state intends that behavior consistent with 
marriage be grounds to terminate alimony. 
There is limited Utah case law on this issue, but cases from 
other jurisdictions are helpful, to show that the relationship in 
this case is sufficient grounds for termination of alimony. 
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ARGUMENT I 
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter resided together 
within the meaning of § 30-3-5(6) U.C.A. 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(6) which allows for the automatic termination 
of alimony in cases where the receiving spouse is residing with 
another person requires a bifurcated analysis. First, the statute 
demands that the former spouse seeking to stop support payments 
prove that the receiving spouse is "residing with a person of the 
opposite sex". Wacker vs. Wacker, 688 P2d (Utah 1983) at 534. 
Once the residence of the person of the opposite sex is 
established, the burden then shifts to the receiving spouse to 
prove that the relationship is without sexual contact. Wacker 
supra. 
The term cohabit or cohabitation is defined as: "dwelling 
together, intercourse together as husband and wife, living or 
abiding or residing together as man and wife". Reside means to 
"[l]ive, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge". Blacks Law 
Dictionary 1308 (6th Ed., 1990). 
The term "reside" implies that not only must the person stay 
but that there be some continuity to the relationship ("to dwell 
permanently or continuously.") In Knuteson vs. Knuteson, 619 P2 
1387 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the provision 
for the first time in 1980. The court held that the statute did 
11 
"not appear to cover a temporary stay at another's home." 
Knuteson, supra at 1389. Citing to Webster's New Twentieth Century 
Dictionary, 2d Edition, the court defined the term as "[t]0 dwell 
permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for 
a time." Knuteson, supra at 1389. (emphasis added) 
In Knuteson, supra the supporting spouse, Mr. Knuteson, had 
refused to pay the court ordered alimony and thus Mrs. Knuteson was 
unable to maintain her basic utility services. She moved into the 
home of a male neighbor for less than three months, but immediately 
moved back out as soon as she was able to collect monies owed to 
her. Justice Henroid relied in his decision not only on the short 
term of the arrangement, but on the misconduct of the payor spouse, 
in causing the emergency, to deny relief from alimony. 
In this case, no emergency existed, and alimony was paid until 
the Petition was filed. 
In a later case, Wacker vs. Wacker, 668 P2 533 (Utah 1983) the 
receiving spouse on her own volition moved into the home of Dennis 
Warr, a person of the opposite sex. The ex-wife had lived in that 
home for three years when the ex-husband sought to terminate 
spousal support. While Warr and Mrs. Wacker lived together they 
shared the cost of rent, utilities, and groceries. The trial court 
refused to terminate alimony. The Utah Supreme Court held with 
little discussion that Mr. Wacker had met the burden of 
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establishing residence, and because Mrs. Wacker testified that she 
and Warr had had sexual relations, alimony was terminated. Mrs. 
Wacker apparently attempted a Knuteson defense, which was not 
accepted. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff and Hunter lived together from 
September, 1993 to February, 1994. The only time they did not 
spend together was when he was out of town for business reasons. 
Indeed, both Plaintiff and Hunter testified that their relationship 
was not temporary and that they have discussed the possibility of 
marriage. Although Hunter does not help pay any of Plaintiff's 
expenses, he enjoys the benefits of her home in which she has paid 
the utilities and on occasion he dines on meals she prepared from 
groceries that she purchased. Moreover, Hunter admits that he 
maintains some clothing at Plaintiff's home and that she routinely 
does some of his laundry, making the facts similar to the situation 
in Wacker. supra. The relationship between Hunter and Plaintiff 
demonstrates indicia of permanency as did the relationship between 
Mrs. Wacker and Warr. Unlike the receiving spouse in Knuteson, 
Joyce Pendleton in the instant case resides with the person of the 
opposite sex voluntarily. 
Finally, like the receiving spouse in Wacker, supra Joyce 
Pendleton in the instant case admits to having sexual relations 
with Bill Hunter. Thus, like Wacker, supra, Defendant in the 
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instant case has met his burden of establishing the residence of 
Plaintiff with Hunter. Plaintiff has failed to rebut that 
residence by proof of a "relationship without any sexual contact". 
Therefore, the court of appeals should reverse the findings of 
trial court and grant Defendant's petition to terminate Defendant's 
obligation to pay alimony to Plaintiff. 
Haddow vs. Haddow 707 P2 669 (Utah 1985) is the most recent 
case discussing cohabitation. The court notes that the term 
"cohabitation" does not lend itself to a universal definition, and 
follows the dictionary definition "to live together as husband and 
wife" Haddow supra at 671 (Appellant asks, rhetorically, whether 
there is any limit to the variety of husband and wife 
relationships?) 
In Haddow, the court states that common residency means the 
sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their 
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief time. Sexual 
contact means participation in a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and 
wife, Haddow supra at 672. Was Joyce Pendleton's residence also 
Bill's principle domicile? His car was not claimed to be his 
domicile, nor did he claim to reside with his ex-wife during the 
eight months from August, 1993 through February, 1994. Could his 
apartment be his principle domicile? He only went there for an 
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hour or two each day (R 395 L15 - 396 Lll), and rarely slept there, 
perhaps once a week at which time Joyce accompanied him. Ninety 
percent of the nights were spent at Joyce's home. (R 386 L25 - 387 
L14; R 370 16 - Lll) He shared meals with her as often as possible 
(R 389 L12 - L25) He dressed and left for work from her house (R 
386 L18 - 25) The very clothes he wore to court had been cleaned 
for him by Joyce Pendleton (R 406 L6 -L9) He used his key to come 
and go from Joyce Pendleton's home as he pleased. (R 388 L 14 -
L18), R 397 L 18 - 20) He parked a car at her home until December, 
1994. (R 391 L 20 - L24; R 376 L6 - L23) Clearly, Joyce 
Pendleton's residence was Bill Hunter's principle domicile. 
Importantly, the Court in Haddow stated that sharing of 
financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a household 
is not a requisite element of cohabitation, Haddow supra 673, 
emphasis added. In Haddow, supra, as in this case, the parties 
largely bore their own living expenses although they shared some 
food and laundry expenses, use of vehicles, and travel expenses. 
The Court in Haddow, supra, also focuses on the issue of the 
house key, citing an Iowa case, In re Marriage of Gibson Iowa 
(1982) 320 NW2d 822, 823-824, to support it's finding that the 
third party, who did not have a key, was not a resident, Haddow, 
supra at 973 - 974. Appellant believes that it is very significant 
that Bill Hunter had a key to Joyce Pendleton's house, that he came 
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and went on his own schedule and was on the premises when she was 
not there. 
The issue of residence, under Haddow, supra, is not determined 
solely by the amount of time Bill Hunter spent at Joyce Pendleton's 
home, but by other factors as well. Although the nature of these 
other factors is not defined, it is noted that a resident comes and 
goes whether or not the co-resident was present; this occured. A 
resident has his/her own key; this occured, Haddow supra at 673. 
The issue of continuity is clearly an important one. How long 
a period of cohabitation is required to satisfy the statute? Three 
months was too short in Knuteson, supra; three years was long 
enough in Wacker, supra. In Haddow, fourteen months was 
insufficient, but the third party almost always went back to his 
separate residence to sleep, Haddow, supra 670-671, rather than 
spending nearly all his nights, as in this case. In Haddow, supra, 
proof of residency failed on the nature rather than the length of 
the relationship. 
Appellant submits that the trial court did not give sufficient 
weight to the fact that the hiatus in their relationship occured 
concurrent with Appellant's pressing of his suit, that Bill Hunter 
and Joyce Pendleton had keys to the other's residence, that both 
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter express a continued desire to 
marry, and that their relationship continued through the date of 
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trial. 
ARGUMENT II 
Plaintiff's Cohabitation was the type of Abuse of Alimony 
That the Legislature Sought to Address 
It was precisely this type of situation that the legislature 
sought to prevent by enacting House Bill 188. Prior to 1979 the 
statute regarding the provision of spousal and child support 
remained largely unchanged from it's original 1898 form. Alimony 
was traditionally terminated upon the remarriage of the receiving 
spouse. 43rd Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor 
Debate, Disc. no. 5, February 26, 1989 morning session. In the 
past in Utah, social mores had prevented cohabitation between a 
receiving spouse and a person of the opposite sex. However, by 
1979, society no longer inhibited cohabitation and as a result, 
the legislature was concerned that supporting spouses were left 
paying support despite the receiving spouse entering into a de 
facto marriage. Id. The sponsor of the provision, Representative 
Pace, stated during the debate in the Utah State House of 
Representatives that the purpose of the new law was to establish 
a public policy that if a couple choose to "share the bed", then 
they must "share the board", supra. The intent of the legislature 
in enacting paragraph 3 of House Bill 188 was to allow courts to 
grant supporting spouses relief from alimony when the receiving 
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spouse choose to live with a person of the opposite sex "under 
conditions consistent with marriage". Id. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff and Hunter live under 
conditions consistent with marriage. The couple have an exclusive 
dating relationship and socialize only with each other. They spend 
the majority of their nights together and enjoy an intimate sexual 
relationship. Plaintiff gave Hunter a key to her home. Although 
he continued to maintain his own apartment, he spent very little 
time there. He kept a few items of clothing at Plaintiff's home. 
Plaintiff did some of Hunter's laundry and occasionally cooks for 
him as well. Although Hunter is still married to his estranged 
wife, he and Plaintiff have discussed the possibility of marrying 
one another in the future. This is evidence of an on-going, 
permanent relationship. It is not indicative of a temporary one. 
In short, Plaintiff and Hunter share a de facto marriage. This is 
the type of problem that the legislature sought to remedy when it 
enact House Bill 188 in 1979. Accordingly, the trial court should 
have granted Defendant relief from alimony. 
The Utah statute concerning the automatic termination of 
spousal support due to the receiving spouses residing with a person 
of the opposite sex is unique among statutes of this nature across 
the country. Only the Utah statute has a bifurcated scheme. Most 
states analyze the problem of cohabitation or even remarriage as 
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evidence of a change in economic circumstances warranting the 
continue obligation to pay alimony. See In re Marriage of Tower, 
780 P. 2d 863, 867 (Wash. App 1989) (termination of alimony because 
of cohabitation requires subsequent finding of substantial change 
of circumstances); Allgood vs. Allaood, 626 P2d 1323. 1327 (Okl. 
1981) (discussing the then recent amendment of Oklahoma statute to 
terminate alimony for cohabitation based on a change in economic 
circumstances); Dwyer vs. Dwyerf 825 P2d 1018, 1019-20 (Co. App. 
1920) (C.R.S. 14-10-122 (1) & (2) terminates alimony only for 
remarriage and change of economic circumstances); Matter of Re 
Marriage of Bates; 733 P2d 1363, 1364 (Or.1987) (remarriage does 
not terminate alimony per se^ l. Economic circumstances is not an 
element of Utah's statute, Haddow, supra. 
Some states have statutes that allow courts to terminate 
alimony payments based on cohabitation of the receiving spouse with 
a person of the opposite sex. See Wilcoxson vs. Wilcoxsonf 498 So 
2d 1238, 1238-39 (Ala.Civ.App. 1986) (citing Ala. Code §30-2-55 
(1975) alimony may be terminated upon proof "that [receiving] 
spouse is living openly or cohabitating with a member of the 
opposite sex11); In re Marriage of Frasco. 638 N.E. 2d 655, 659 
(111, App. 4 Dist, 1994) (citing 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40 para 
510(c)) alimony is terminated "if the party receiving maintenance 
cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal 
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basis"). 
In Frasco. supra, the ex-wife moved in with a friend nine 
months after finalizing her divorce. Frasco, supra. Subsequently, 
the pair opened a joint checking account for the payment of 
household expenses. Each had their own bedroom and claimed to have 
had no sexual relations with the other. They each shared household 
chores. Frasco, supra at 658. The friend characterized their 
relationship as "close friends" and during the entire time he 
remained married to his wife who was committed to a nursing home 
suffering from numerous debilitating diseases. The ex-wife and 
friend were constant companions, but ten months after the ex-wife 
moved in the friend moved out because of the "legal harassment" and 
surveillance by the ex-husband. Still the couple remained close 
and the friend spent holidays with the ex-wife and her family. The 
ex-husband sought to terminate alimony based on cohabitation. The 
trial court held that the relationship was more an economic 
relationship like roommates that a resident, continuing conjugal 
one. The Illinois Court of Appeals Fourth District reversed the 
trial court's decision, holding that the court had abused it's 
discretion. Frasco, supra at 660. The court of appeals held that 
the Illinois law required a showing of a de facto husband and wife 
relationship to justify terminating spousal maintenance. Frasco, 
supra at 659. The court held that the ex-husband need not prove 
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sexual relations between the pari in order to make a case of 
cohabitation on a conjugal basis. Frasco. supra. Moreover, a de 
fact husband and wife relationship could exist between the ex-wife 
and friend even though he was still married. Id. The court held 
that the couple shared a domestic relationship that was nearly the 
"traditional model of marriage". Their relationship continued to 
be close even after the friend moved out and it was reasonable to 
presume that they would resume co-residency once litigation had 
ended because that was the sole reason for his departure. 
Frasco, supra at 659-60. The court held that the case fell within 
the purpose of the statute which was "to prevent a spouse from 
achieving indirectly (by cohabitation on a resident, continuing 
conjugal basis), what could not be achieved directly (by 
remarriage)." Frasco, supra at 660. 
In McCluskey vs. McCluskey, 528 So2d. 328, 329 (Ala. Civ.App. 
1988) the ex-wife (Barbara) and a man named Mr. Smith (Smith) did 
not move in together. However, they did spend about one-half to 
two-thirds of their nights together at Barbara's apartment. 
McCluskey, supra at 329-30. Barbara paid all of her own expenses. 
Smith maintained his own apartment where he received all of his 
mail. Smith did not perform any chores at Barbara's apartment. 
Smith did not move any personal property into Barbara's home except 
a few clothes that he left on occasion. Barbara did none of 
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Smith's laundry. Barbara did not financially support Smith in any 
way except for meals that she prepared for him when he spent the 
evening at her apartment. Smith and Barbara periodically went on 
vacation together and Smith paid the majority of the expenses 
during these trips. The pair frequently socialized together, and 
although they did not tell anyone that they spent evenings 
together, neither did they hid the fact. When they spent evenings 
together they frequently had sexual intercourse. After nearly a 
year had passed from when this relationship began the ex-husband 
(Fred) petitioned the trial court to terminate alimony. The trial 
court held Barbara's relationship with Smith to be open 
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex in violation of Ala. 
Code 30-2-55 (1975). Therefore, the court granted Fred's petition 
for relief from the obligation to pay alimony. On appeal the court 
held that the party seeking to terminate the alimony must show that 
the receiving spouse must be living openly or cohabitating with a 
member of the opposite sex and that there must be a demonstration 
of the permanency of the relationship. The court affirmed the 
trial court's decision. Barbara and Smith had openly maintained 
their relationship for nearly a year and during that time spent the 
majority of their evenings together. Both Barbara and Smith had 
testified that they would continue their relationship. Thus, the 
court held that the ex-husband had met his burden. McCluskey, 
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supra at 331. 
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has held in other cases 
with facts similar to those in the instant case that termination 
of alimony was proper. See Kennedy vs. Kennedy, 598 So. 2d 985, 
986 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (ex-wife lived with man for five years 
with separate bedrooms and bathrooms, both denied sexual contact, 
man did not pay rent but did perform household maintenance 
services, and both shared expenses); Taylor vs. Taylor, 550 So.2d 
996 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (ex-wife and man lived together and saw 
each other exclusively for six and one half months, he moved his 
clothes into her home and she gave him a key, he helped with her 
finances and shared in chores); Daniels vs. Daniels, 599 So.2d 1208 
(Ala.Civ.App. 1992) (ex-wife moved in with man and lived with him 
for seven years, she did not pay rent but performed household 
chores instead, they did not have sexual relations, she paid for 
half the utilities and he purchased a car which he registered in 
his name and hers). 
The facts of the instant case are nearly identical to those 
in McCluskey, supra. Plaintiff and Hunter shared no expenses. 
Hunter has moved no personal property into Plaintiff's home other 
than a few clothes. Hunter received no mail at Plaintiff's home. 
Also like McCluskey, Plaintiff and Hunter spent the majority of 
their nights together. When they spent their evenings together, 
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they often shared their meals and had sexual relations. Hunter 
and Plaintiff socialized exclusively with each other. They took 
vacations together during which Hunter pays the majority of the 
expenses. Plaintiff has brought Hunter to family gatherings. 
Importantly, both Hunter and Plaintiff claim that they will 
continue their relationship after the litigation has ended. Thus, 
like McCluskey. supra, Plaintiff and Hunter enjoy an open and on-
going relationship and all indications are that it is permanent. 
Unlike McCluskeyf supra, Plaintiff gave Hunter a key to her 
house. Through this act, Plaintiff gave Hunter complete and 
unlimited access to her home. In a case interpreting the meaning 
of the word "cohabitation" as used in a divorce decree the Supreme 
Court of Iowa held that the most import single factor in their 
conclusion that the ex-wife and male friend were cohabitating was 
the man's "complete and unlimited access to" her home. In Re 
Marriage of Harvey, 466 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Iowa 1991). 
Plaintiff and Hunter live together as de facto husband and 
wife despite Hunter's continued married status with his current 
wife, just like the ex-wife and her friend in Frasco. Like the 
couple in Frasco, Plaintiff and Hunter in the instant case share 
a close relationship. Hunter has done some projects around the 
house and Plaintiff does some of his laundry. Although they do not 
have a joint checking account for expenses as did the couple in 
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Frasco, supra, Plaintiff and Hunter enjoy a complete and continuing 
sexual relationship unlike the couple in Frasco. Importantly, the 
law in Illinois and the law in Utah are similar and have the same 
purpose: "to prevent a spouse from achieving indirectly (by 
cohabitation on a residence, continuing conjugal basis), what could 
not be achieved directly (by remarriage).11 Thus, Defendant urges 
the court to reverse the trial court decision and grant Defendant's 
petition for termination of alimony like the court did in Frasco. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals should grant Defendant's Petition for 
Termination of Alimony and reverse the trial court's decision. The 
Utah statute requires an initial demonstration of Plaintiff 
"residing" with a person of the opposite sex. Residence involves 
dwelling together and some sense of permanency in the relationship. 
Defendant has successfully demonstrated this point and Plaintiff 
cannot rebut the residence because she admits to having a 
continuing sexual relationship with Hunter. 
The nature of the relationship between Hunter and Plaintiff 
is essentially de facto husband and wife. The legislature sought 
to grant supporting spouses relief from alimony when the receiving 
spouse engaged in a relationship that was in all other respects 
marriage. The relationship in the instant case is precisely that 
type of relationship that the legislature was so concerned about. 
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States with statutes similar to Utah's have interpreted them 
so as to terminate the obligation to pay alimony under facts nearly 
identical to those in the instant case. For these reasons 
Defendant urges the court to reverse the trial court decision and 
grant it's Petition to Terminate Alimony. 
DATED this ^ —-; day of August, 1995. 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to J. Bruce Reading, Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellee, at 261 East 300 South #200, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on this C5 day of August, 1995. 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOYCE A. PENDLETON, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
ROBERT L. PENDLETON, Case No. 904900500DA 
Defendant. : Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above matter came on for hearing before Judge Kenneth 
Rigtrup on January 27, 1995. The Plaintiff appeared in person and 
with her attorney of record, J. Bruce Reading, and the Defendant 
appeared in person and with his attorney of record, Kathryn S. 
Denholm. Upon the Defendant having rested his case in chief, the 
Plaintiff brought a Motion for a Judgment based upon the fact that 
Defendant had not met his burden of proof. The Court, having heard 
evidence and being fully advised in the law, enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant filed a Petition for Termination of 
Alimony in October 1993 requesting that Plaintiff's alimony be 
terminated based upon Plaintiff's cohabitation. 
J. BRUCE READING (USB No. 2700) 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
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2. On or about that date, Defendant stopped payment 
alimony payments to the Plaintiff and, in lieu thereof, paid said 
payments into a holding account. 
3. Joyce Pendleton, Plaintiff, and Bill Hunter 
commenced a sexual relationship in July 1993 which relationship 
continued significantly and unabated through February 1994, a 
period of eight months. 
4. Since August 1994 to the present time, Ms. Pendleton 
and Mr. Hunter have established a fairly consistent pattern of 
sexual relations. 
5. During the time period of July 1993 through February 
1994, Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton spent most of their free time 
together. 
6. During that eight-month period, Mr. Hunter and Ms. 
Pendleton ate a few meals together and shared some expenses; 
although it appears that Mr. Hunter bought most frequently when 
they went out. Mr. Hunter did eat meals free at Ms. Pendleton's 
house when she did fix meals. 
7. Mr. Hunter had, on occasion, his clothes at the 
house of Ms. Pendleton and occasionally he had a briefcase there. 
8. Ms. Pendleton did some token laundry for Mr. Hunter 
and carried some of his dry cleaning to the cleaning establishment 
next door. Mr. Hunter reimbursed Ms. Pendleton for the dry 
cleaning that she had had done on his behalf. 
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9. Mr. Hunter shaved, showered, and prepared himself 
for the day at her residence after having spent the night with Ms. 
Pendleton. 
10. It appears that Mr. Hunter rented an apartment 
approximately one (1) day prior to the filing of Defendant's 
petition; however, Mr. Hunter's wife and children were living in 
the Magna area. Some of his belongings were in that home, some of 
his things were in his vehicle, and some items were at Joyce 
Pendleton's. 
11. Mr. Hunter did not use Ms. Pendleton's residence as 
a mailing address. Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton did not share any 
assets or any financial arrangements of any kind except to the 
extent that there was a nominal sharing of a vehicle for 
transportation purposes. 
12. Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton did travel on several 
overnight trips and there was some sharing of expenses during these 
trips. 
13. The evidence is clear and unmistakable that Mr. 
Hunter made no significant or casual contribution to Ms. Pendleton 
for any household expenses. He made no mortgage payments or 
utility payments, and there was no commitment to do so. 
14. Janet Hunter now lives in Montana with the Hunter's 
dependent children and Mr. Hunter maintains a marital relationship 
with Janet Hunter. Mr. Hunter is not presently divorced from his 
wife, nor has he filed for divorce. 
3
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The controlling law in this case is 30-3-5(6) of the 
Utah Code wherein "alimony terminates upon the establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a 
person of the opposite sex." 
2. The Court deems that some sort of duration to the 
residency is necessary pursuant to Haddow v. Haddow, 702 P.2d 6669 
(Utah 1985). 
3. "Residing" under the statute is different from 
domicile. 
4. Residency contemplates some duration, some 
continuity, some commitment to a shared, beneficial relationship. 
5. Neither Mr. Hunter nor Mr. Pendleton considered Ms. 
Pendleton's home to be Mr. Hunter's principal place of residence. 
Any sharing of a common residence was for a temporary period of 
time and, therefore, is not residency as contemplated as required 
by the statute. 
6. Although the Court finds that there have been sexual 
relations such is not sufficient to meet the burden of the statute. 
7. The Court finds that the Defendant has not met his 
burden of proof and concludes that the petition is without merit 
and dismisses the same without prejudice. 
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8. Each party will be responsible for their own 
attorney fees and costs. 
.£ DATED this *g( ^ day of March, 1995. 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to the following party on the day of March, 1995: 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm 
Attorney for Defendant , 
-263 East 2100 3outh i3W3^ ^ ° H °° 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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TRANSCRIPT OF RULING FROM BENCH 
25 THE COURT: We are not dealing in this case 
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1 with cohabitation. We are dealing with 30-3-5, 
2 subparagraph 6 of the Utah Code Annotated, and the 
3 driving concept is "residing." That is the issue to be 
4 determined. "Terminates upon establishment by the party 
5 paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a 
6 person of the opposite sex." And the difficulty, as 
7 counsel as alluded to, that it is not defined by 
8 definition. However, the term connotes some sort of 
9 duration as was alluded to by the Supreme Court in Haddow 
10 vs. Haddow. 
11 In this particular case there is no dispute in 
12 the evidence and so it is clear and without dispute that 
13 Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter commenced a relationship, 
14 including sexual relationships in July of 1993 and 
15 continued significantly and unabated through February of 
16 1994, a period of eight months. That they have again 
17 reinstated a fairly consistant pattern of sexual 
18 relations and contact from August of 1994 to present, a 
19 period of six months. 
20 As indicated in Haddow vs. Haddow, we are not 
21 just talking about sexual relations or physical contact. 
22 There was no dispute, at least as to the first eight-
23 month period that Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton spent most 
24 of their free time together. Although they ate together 
25 on occasions, giving the hours that Ms. Pendleton spent 
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in the beauty salon and the hours that Mr. Hunter spent 
peddling real estate, they ate few meals together and 
perhaps in that context shared some expenses, all except 
he bought most frequently when they went out. He ate 
free at her house when she fixed meals. 
It is clear and without dispute that the 
pictures he had of his clothes at the house, on and off, 
that he had a briefcase there. She did some very token 
laundry. Carried some of his dry cleaning to the 
cleaning establishment next door. And Mr. Hunter 
acknowledged that on occasion he shaved, but I suspect 
that given the hours on the log when his car was there, 
he was showering and brushing his teeth and the whole 
nine yards in the morning. 
The residence separate apartment. The first 
rent period was from October 25, 1993. The Petition to 
Eliminate Alimony was filed October 26th. So the rent 
created was one day prior to the fi'l.ing of the petition. 
So the Court is not pursuaded about the genuiness of that 
lease agreement, but nonetheless during that same period 
of time Mr. Hunter's wife and children were living in the 
Magna area. Some of his things were at that house, some 
of the things were in his vehicle, and a few items were 
at Joyce Pendleton's. 
There is no evidence that Mr. Hunter used the 
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Pendleton residence as a mailing address. There is no 
evidence that Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton shared any 
assets or any financial arrangements of any kind, except 
to the extent that there was nominal evidence about 
sharing the vehicle for transportation purposes. 
The only other sharing in this record is that 
when they travelled on those several overnight trips, 
there was some sharing of the expense. 
With respect to the dry cleaning, the evidence 
was that Mr. Hunter reimbursed Ms. Pendleton for the dry 
cleaning she had done in his behalf. The evidence is 
clear and unmistakable that Mr. Hunter made no 
significant or casual contribution to Ms. Pendleton for 
the household expenses. No mortgage payments. No 
utility payments and there was no commitment. 
Although "residing" under the statute is maybe 
to some extent different than "domicile." It is 
nevertheless a function to some extent of intention and 
what is contemplated. And in the Haddow case, the 
relationship in question, though not quite as intense 
over the period that the Court finds occurred during at 
least August, September, October, November and into the 
first part of the year, the Haddow relationship was one 
24 I of 14 months. 
25 The evidence is silent as to when Janet Haddow 
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was located in Montana and that residence occurred. The 
evidence is without dispute that she now lives in Montana 
with dependant children of Mr. Haddov's. That he 
maintains the marital relationship and has not divorced 
his wife. Has not filed for divorce and that there are 
no contemplated plans. 
The Haddow case defines "common residence" 
indicating that the sharing of common wealth of both 
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a 
temporary or brief period of time. They observed in that 
case, that as well, there was sexual contact even if 
extensive, it does not constitute cohabitation. 
The significant thing in the Supreme Court's 
mind and in this Court's mind, is that residency 
contemplates some duration, some continuity, some 
commitment to a shared beneficial relationship. 
Something more than just sexual relations. In this case, 
although it wasn't a requirement about shared expenses, 
there was some indication "Well, it ought not to be 
considered." In this case the Court really finds no 
shared or financial commitments. 
At page 674 the Supreme Court observed, "In 
view of these circumstances, it is clear," is the 
language they employed, "that neither appellant nor Mr. 
Hudson considered appellant's home Mr. Hudson's first 
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1 principal residence. " 
2 It is difficult for the Court to conclude 
3 otherwise given the fact that Mr, Hunter is still a 
4 married man and is unattached, that he has made no 
5 financial commitments that have been demonstrated to Mrs. 
6 Pendleton and is not in the position, at least at this 
7 point, to make those type of commitments. 
8 The Court finds and concludes that the 
9 residency requirement of the statute, the burden of the 
10 proof, has not been met by the defendant; and concludes 
11 that petition is without merit and dismisses the same 
12 without prejudice. 
13 No one raised the issue of fees, so I don't 
14 have to worry about it, other than to say you made your 
15 own bed, Ms. Pendleton. You have got to sleep in it. 
16 Each party is to pay their own fees and costs. 
17 MR. READING: We have not received alimony 
18 since the time of filing. Could we have an order that 
19 money be paid to us, together with fee interest at the 
20 prejudgment rate at the present time? 
21 THE COURT: The issue is not before me and the 
22 statement by counsel has been that those checks have been 
23 paid to her office. I assume she has got it in her trust 
24 account and can bring it current. 
25 MS. DENHOLM: Even though I think interest 
20 
1» li ft \ K ft 
would not be appropriate. 
MR. READING: It is the standard. It is 
dismissed. 
THE COURT: I guess we could spend another 3 or 
400 in rebuttal fees coming back. I assume the parties can 
work it out. The Court is not here to make moral 
judgments. Whether it suits me or not is irrelevant. I 
am bound to follow the decisions of the Appellate Court 
of the state whether I personally agree or not. 
MR. READING: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
I will prepare those for the counsel's signature. 
THE CORUT: Very good. 
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